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Abstract: 
 
The breakdown of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and the incremental democratisation of such regimes is 
surely one of the most crucial events in the last two decades. In these contexts, the functioning of justice systems has 
become, more and more, one of the key aspects of the transition process.  
In this context, the article analyses the process of judicial reform in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. The article aims to 
explore how theoretical approaches developed by comparative judicial studies scholars fare against the evidence from 
the democratising process of the judiciary in such countries. Then, particular attention will be focused upon the level of 
institutionalization of the judicial systems, trying to explain why judicial systems in these countries continue to be 
poorly institutionalized.  
 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
The breakdown of authoritarian and totalitarians regimes in Eastern Europe over the last two 
decades and the slow democratisation of such regimes is one of the most significant political and 
historical events of the last century. In these contexts, the functioning of justice systems has 
become, more and more, one of the key aspects of the transition process. The establishment of an 
independent, fair and efficient judicial system is in fact an important instrument for a country 
breaking with its authoritarian past. Courts became crucial actors in the transition process as they 
contribute to develop new legislations, to adapt old rules to the new context and to prevent the 
arbitrary use of power (Larkins 1986, Kryger, Czarnota and Sadurski 2006). Notwithstanding, the 
experience of some of those countries highlighted that the reform of the judicial system represents a 
crucial policy field, extremely resilient to changes and particularly threatened by political actors 
influences.  
This article analyses the process of judicial reform in three post-communist countries (Slovenia, 
Croatia and Serbia) belonging to the Former Yugoslavia. These countries, although with some 
differences, had experienced a long, difficult and unfinished process of judicial reform. Analysing 
the processes of judicial reform in the three countries, the article aims also to show how the main 
theoretical approaches applied by comparative judicial scholars to analyse judicial reform in 
                                                 
1 An early version of this paper has been presented at the Joint Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association 
(LSA) and the Research Committee on Sociology of Law (RCSL), Berlin, Humboldt University, 25-28 July 2007.  
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transitional countries fare against the evidence in the case studies. Particular attention will be also 
paid at the level of institutionalization of the judicial systems, trying to explain why judicial 
systems in these countries continue to be poorly institutionalized. 
 
2. Judicial reforms in transition: main theoretical approaches and concerns 
 
Within the comparative judicial studies literature, two are the main theoretical approaches 
used by the scholars to explain judicial reforms in transitional countries (Magalhaes 1999, Ishiyama 
and Ishiyama 2000, Herron and Randazzo 2000, Boulanger 2003). The first approach argues for the 
importance of the institutional and cultural legacy of the preceding undemocratic regimes that 
conditions the adoption of democratic institutional arrangements. The second perspective 
emphasizes new political actors’ self-interest strategies and considers the outcome of the reforms as 
the product of bargaining among the main political players (Magalhaes, Guarnieri and Kaminis 
2006)  
With reference to the judicial system, the first theoretical approach, we call “legacy of the past 
approach” was originally applied by Toharia (1975)2, in his work on the magistracy during the 
Franco’s regime in Spain. According to Toharia in the context of authoritarian regimes, the 
judiciary enjoys some limited guarantees of independence. The regime influences the nomination of 
judges on a higher level, to which it entrusts the management of the corps. The judiciary is 
‘isolated’ and its action limited to cases with no political relevance, whereas significant cases are 
directly controlled by the executive power (Guarnieri 2003). On the other hand, in the context of 
totalitarian regimes3, the judiciary is totally controlled and integrated into the political system, and 
its guarantee of independence strongly reduced. The decisions made by the judiciary must not clash 
with the regime. The magistracy is actually mobilized in support of the regime by integrating judges 
into the regime’s political organizations. In this case guarantees of independence are non-existent 
and the recruitment and career systems deeply controlled. According to this view, it could be 
expected that in post-totalitarian countries, due to the deep politicization of those structures and 
their constant subordination to the executives during the undemocratic regimes, judicial systems 
remain weakly professionalized and resilient to change. On the other hand, in post-authoritarian 
cases one expects that judicial systems maintain some technical and professional standards in 
decision-making, as the traditional criteria of recruitment and socialization of judicial personnel 
coexist with political ones. Consequently, the democratization of the judiciary would be quicker and 
                                                 
2 Toharia took inspiration as well from an idea developed by Linz (1964) regarding the characteristics of the judiciary in authoritarian 
regimes.  
3 Guarnieri (2003) specifies that when talking about totalitarian regimes he mainly refers to the Nazi Germany and to the communist 
regimes of the Stalin era. 
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easier. Given such distinction, although the Yugoslavian federative republic belonged to the 
authoritarian type, if one looks at the Linz’ (1964) definition, we notice that the judicial systems in 
the three case studies show post-totalitarian traits rather than post-authoritarian ones. The 
organization of the justice during the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (and also during the 90s in 
some countries) was in fact rather similar to the Soviet model of justice, thus presenting more 
totalitarian traits than authoritarian ones. 
The second perspective, according to which the outcome of judicial reforms represents the result of 
struggles between self-interest political actors, emerges from the Rational Choice literature4. As 
Magalhaes (1999) points out, given the relevance and centrality of judicial institutions in the 
moment of transition, these are modelled according to the strategies of the dominant political actors, 
which try to maximise the congruence between the new structures and their own interests. Political 
actors are interested in controlling the design of judicial institutions for two reasons: the reform of 
judicial institutions determine the extent to which political actors can affect the composition of 
courts, allowing or preventing their influence over judicial appointments; secondly, the rules 
regarding status and career influence the responsiveness of judiciary to political actors. The control 
over these kinds of rules increases the congruence between judicial institutions and actors interests 
and preferences (Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002).  
The preferences of the parties and their strategies about the design of judicial institutions are also 
shaped by the degree of uncertainty about electoral results. This last perspective is further 
developed by Ginsburg (2003), in his work on constitutional courts in new democracies and by 
Hirschl (2004), in his contribution on the origin of the new constitutionalism. Summarizing the 
Ginsburg analysis, political parties in power will be more willing to create strong courts when the 
political future is uncertain, as they fear that they will likely be in minority and thus may require 
extra protection to ensure that the other parties will not be able to abuse them. On a similar line, 
Hirschl (2004) specifies also that this judicial empowerment is likely to occur when the judiciary 
public reputation for professionalism and political impartiality is high and when judicial 
appointment is controlled by hegemonic political elites. Although both the Ginsburg and the Hirschl 
analysis are fascinating and fit well in explaining the empowerment of judiciary that occurred for 
example in the post-authoritarian judicial reform in Spain and Portugal, they are not fully telling in 
the countries selected.  
                                                 
4 This hypothesis, which has also been developed in the field of the Rational Choice approach, is based on the well-known utilitarist 
paradox according to which the actors' main goal is to maximise their personal interests. As Guarnieri and Magalhaes (2006) suggest, 
the issue n.28 of Comparative Political Studies, 1995 (especially the essays from Crawford e Lijphart, Comisso, Geddes and 
Hanson), represents a good example for the empirical application of this approach to post communist transformations. Two 
authoritative contributions to this approach are those of Di Palma (1990) and Przeworski (1991). 
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We believe that a deeper explanation to understand judicial reforms in our case studies could be 
reached considering also the institutionalization process of the judiciaries in the ex-Yugoslavia and 
the actual level of judicial systems institutionalization in these countries.  
 
3. Judicial institutionalization in democratizing countries  
In order to analyse the output of judicial reforms in democratizing countries we have to keep 
in mind first of all that we are addressing the development of an historically dependent judiciary 
into an institution that could operate forcefully to enact neutral justice (Larkins 1996). What seems 
to be relevant in order to understand the judicial reform patterns in transitional countries is the 
degree to which courts are able to attain the qualities of a viable institution (Huntington 1968); in 
other words, the process of institutionalization “by which organizations and procedures acquire 
value and stability” (p. 12).  
According to the recent work of Bumin, Randazzo and Walker (2005)5, examining in a comparative 
perspective the institutional development of the judiciary in thirty-nine post-communist and in Latin 
America states6, in order to understand judicial reform within a transitional country it is first of all 
necessary to consider the level of institutionalization of the judiciary in such a country. In fact, the 
judiciaries are able to play a significant role in the democratisation process, only if they develop a 
certain levels of organizational sophistication and autonomy. Only in this case judicial institutions 
become strategically relevant within the political system and could represent a mean for political 
elite to safeguard their interests.  
Although many scholars7 have proposed different indicators to measure the level of 
institutionalization, this remains an abstract concept difficult to operazionalize in empirical terms. 
Huntington (1968), in his seminal work, argues that the level of institutionalization of any particular 
organization can be defined and measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherency. 
Adaptability can partly be deduced from longevity, but also entails functional adaptation, in fact “an 
organization that has adapted itself to changes in its environments and survived one or more 
changes in its principal functions is more highly institutionalized.” (ibidem p.15). Organizational 
complexity may involve “both multiplication of organizational subunits (hierarchically and 
functional), and differentiation of separate type of organizational subunits.” (ibidem p.18). 
                                                 
5 Bumin, Randazzo and Walker make explicit reference to the work of McGuire (2004) on the U.S. Supreme Court process of 
institutionalization. 
6 The authors choose several indicators of the component features of institutional viability and employ factor analysis to produce a 
viability score.  
7 The literature on the organizational institutionalization is broad; Lanzalaco (1995) in his work proposes to differentiate between the 
“classical” or “old” school of institutional studies (among those Weber, Durkheim, Veblen, Ayres, Selznick, Huntington, etc.), and 
the neo-institutional school, developed during the 80s (Scott, Di Maggio, Powell, March and Olsen, etc.). An other development of 
the institutional studies is represented by those studies that applied the neo-classical economical theory to explain the organisational 
institutionalisation (Riker, North, Ostrom, Schotter, Williamson). This distinction between “old” and “new” institutionalism has been 
discussed by many scholars.  
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Autonomy refers to the extent to which organisational and procedures exist independently of other 
groups, organizations and behaviors. Coherence has to do with the degree of consensus within the 
organization on its functional boundaries and on procedures for resolving disputes that arise within 
these boundaries (Randall and Svåsand 2002). Autonomy becomes a means to coherence, enabling 
organization to develop a distinctive esprit and style and prevents the intrusion of disruptive 
external forces.  
Taking inspiration by the Huntington (1968) seminal work and by the Bumin, Randazzo and 
Walker recent proposal, we focused our analysis on some aspects of judicial reforms that could help 
us in assessing the level of complexity, autonomy and coherence of the judiciary in the three 
countries. The following section will present the analysis of the judicial reform patterns in the 
countries selected, with a particular attention to the empirical aspects listed in Table 18. 
Table 1. Dimensions of judicial institutionalisation analysed in each country 
Dimension of 
institutionalization 
 
Aspects analyzed in each country 
Complexity 
- Hierarchical structure 
- Courts Diffusion on the territory (horizontal structure) 
- Stages of appeal 
- Specialized courts  
Autonomy - Constitutional guarantees 
- Role of a self-governing body 
- Executive power on judicial administration 
- External influence on the selection process 
-  Courts jurisdiction 
Coherence - Role and status of the judges unions 
- Nature of professional socialization 
- Organisation of the training system 
 
Thus, the focus will be on the main features of judicial organization and administration, on the 
existence of a self-governing body (and its functioning), on judicial recruitment, on the existence of 
a judges representative (and its effective role), and finally on the more recent development of the 
judicial reform. The sources of empirical data are primarily reports and records of international 
organizations monitoring judicial reforms (such as Aba-Ceeli, EUMAP, and the EU) and 
information gathered through semi-structured interviews to strategic actors collected during on-site 
visits in the countries. In some cases also newspaper articles have been used. 
 
3. Background conditions 
In the Balkan region the Romanist civil law tradition was introduced only after centuries of 
Ottoman domination, especially in the countries of the Southern Balkans. Although Slovenia and 
                                                 
8 The dimension definitions and the selection of the empirical aspects are drawn on the work of Guarnieri and Pederzoli (2002). 
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Croatia were the two regions less touched by the Ottoman domination, the strong Hungarian 
traditions and usages avoided the fully penetration of Romanist civil law in the area until the 
beginning of the XIX century (Benacchio 1995). Moreover during the XIX century, the unstable 
socio-political system reigning in these countries delayed the common development and 
modernisation of the political and administrative institutions (Hosch 2006). After 1918, the new 
State of Serbs, Croats and Slovene (in 1921 it became Yugoslavia) was formed. The legal 
organization of this state was very diverse, partially ranged form Austrian and Hungarian sources, 
from Italian law and from the Sharia (Islamic law, especially in Serbia and Bosnia). Never were the 
organization and the status of judges in this state uniform, as the state was divided in six “legal 
areas” (Uzelac 2000). The first common codified legislation was enacted only in 1929 (Code of 
Civil Procedure). 
Thus, when Balkan countries entered the Soviet sphere of influence, a fully institutionalised 
judiciary system did not yet exist. Many judicial institutions (Constitutional Court, High courts and 
tribunals) were in fact created during the soviet experience. Although Yugoslavian socialism 
increasingly differed from the soviet model as a result of decentralization and greater respect for 
local autonomy (Bianchini 1986), the organization of justice in the Yugoslavian model had many 
features in common with the soviet one. This model spread across the Eastern Block countries in 
the period following the Second World War and it followed the judicial experience of the Soviet 
State. Judicial organization took most inspiration from the principle of the “unity of power” and its 
corollary. Judges were selected through an election system that granted them pro-tempore 
representative powers, thus making them responsible for the body that elected them. Jurymen 
participated with magistrates in the different instances of judgment. No judicial control was 
exercised over the constitutionality of any normative acts. Even after Tito’s rejection of Stalinism, 
in Yugoslavia the organization and function of justice never detached from the basis of the socialist 
right (Ajani 1996). 
The Yugoslavian Socialist Republic Constitution of 1974 perfectly matches the principles described 
above and generically proclaims the principle of independence of judges. In practice, from election 
to confirmation, judges and their work were in fact controlled by party organizations. However, 
Uzelac (2003) highlights that in socialist Yugoslavia political intervention in the judicial sphere were 
not intense as during the Stalin era in the Soviet Union. Overall the judiciary was neglected and 
marginalized, as the majority of social problems were solved through party mechanisms and other 
non-institutional channels. Judges’ decisions were usually still limited to dismissal of public officers, 
and the incrimination of opponents or intellectuals criticizing the dominant ideology.  
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Two parallel systems of conflict-resolution were in place during the Socialist Republic: one, at the 
party level tended to prevent and resolve every significant disputes by political talks; the other, the 
traditional court system, was in charge of less important matters, such as small claims and land-
related issues, etc. (Uzelac 2000). Party members and political exponents were granted absolute 
immunity. In the 60s and 70s judges were frequently publicly recalled for not being rigorous enough 
in cases related to verbal offences against the party. Tito himself delivered a speech in relation to this 
topic in 1967.  
Although one could argue that this “parallel system” of conflict resolution was quite common in the 
authoritarian regimes (see Toharia 1975), the main difference concerning the Yugoslavian system 
of justice laid in the full party control over the appointment and career procedure. An evaluation 
concerning the political suitability of individuals was a major criterion in the initial selection and re-
election of judges. Although party interference operated in a rather subtle and indirect manner 
during the SFRY (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia), the legal system continued to 
function as an instrument for the suppression of political dissidence (Cohen 1992), social status and 
prestige of judges significantly decreased and consequently they progressively became less 
professionalized in terms of their qualifications.  
Nevertheless, the fact that many of the judicial institutions, like the federal Constitutional court, the 
State Constitutional courts and the State Supreme Courts, were established during these years, 
suggests that at least the level of organizational complexity (Huntington 1968) was improved during 
the SFRY. While the other dimensions of institutionalization (autonomy and coherence) remained 
low. In fact, the judiciary was not clearly distinct from other political organizations and its role was 
marginalized. Moreover, although in the Federal Republic Constitution, as well as in the 
Constitution of each republic, judicial independence was formally guaranteed, in practice 
procedures protecting independence of the institution vis-à-vis other political actors were never 
implemented. During the 90s, after the desegregation of the FRY, the first relevant change that each 
states had to face was to establish the primacy of the national legal system, eliminating any 
references to the federal one. Slovenia and Croatia were the two states that more quickly started this 
process. Some scholars (see in particular Cohen 1992) evidence that the Yugoslavian desegregation 
had a significant impact also on the administration of justice. The most important change was the 
changing locus and character of political influence as well as new obstacles to the development of 
an independent and depoliticized judiciary, especially in Serbia and Croatia. In what follows, the 
main steps of the judicial reform9 since the 1990s until today will be presented. 
 
                                                 
9 Given the space limits, I will present here only a brief summary of the three case studies focusing on the more relevant aspects for 
the paper topic.  
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4. Judicial reforms in Slovenia  
The Slovene legal system belongs to the continental legal systems, under the influence of 
German law and legal order, as the territory was a part of the Austrian Empire for a long time. The 
legal system was transformed according to the socialist models, when the territory joined the 
Yugoslav republic. The impact of the institutes such as socialized property, socialistic self-
management, protection of workers and lower social class can still be found in the legal system 
today(Čarni and Košak 2006). 
The Republic of Slovenia became an independent and sovereign state on June 199110. Slovenia 
experienced a relatively smooth democratic transition, as the independence was the result of gradual 
political and social changes starting from the 80s (Toš and Miheljak 2002). Some months after the 
independence, the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted, introducing the principle 
of the separation of powers and defining the task of the judicial branch. In addition to these basic 
provisions, the constitution determines that the judges shall independently exercise their duties and 
lays out the basic principles on the organisation and jurisdiction of the courts, the participation of 
citizens in the performance of judicial functions, the election of judges, the Judicial Council, and 
other relevant principles (Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia 2007). During the first years 
after the independence (1991-1994) there was not a comprehensive reform of the judiciary, as the 
judiciary was quite functioning and it was not perceived as one of the more urgent need for the 
country. In fact, Slovenian political elite chose to focus on the restructuring of national economy. 
With this aim three important laws were passed: law on society ownership, law on nationalization 
(to give back the nationalized properties) and law on privatization. Although these laws were not 
directly related to the organization of justice, they have had a direct impact of the judiciary as, due 
to the high political relevance of the application of such laws, the pressure of the political parties 
over the judiciary started to increase.  
Coehn (1992) argues that, at the beginning of the 90s, some cases of what it defines the ethno-
political justice occurred even in Slovenia. The fact that some Slovenian political leaders were 
disillusioned communist and former political dissidents, persecuted and imprisoned by the 
communist regime, brought to some cases of unjustified dismissal and replacement. However, this 
happened to a minor extent in comparison to the other countries. Thus, if one looks at the 
constitutional guarantees and at the judicial framework provided by the Constitution after the 
transition, it could be argued that this specific dimension of the level of autonomy improved in 
respect to the Federal Republic period. 
 
                                                 
10 On 23 December 1990, 88% of Slovenia’s population voted for independence in a plebiscite, and on 25 June 1991 the Republic of 
Slovenia declared its independence. 
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JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
The most important laws regulating the functioning of the judiciary were passed in 1994: the 
Constitutional Court Act11, the Judicial Service Act12 and the Courts Act13. These are still today the 
laws that regulate the organization and the functioning of the Slovenian judicial system. The 1994 
Judicial Service Act and the Courts Act introduced important changes, especially in organizational 
terms. The first instance courts were divided in county courts of first instance and in district courts 
of first instance. This separation of the basics courts caused the left of many judges because the 
salary was extremely reduced. The number of judges decreased, the number of cases increased as 
the economic reforms implied an high number of trials and proceedings on economic and financial 
matters. According to the Judges Association, in this period originated the high Slovenian backlog 
that still is the major problem of the country. The representative of the Judges Association14 argues 
that during this phase the position of the judiciary vis-à-vis other institutions started to be 
undermined and the political interference over economic-sensitive cases increased (cases regarding 
enterprises denationalization, restitution of confiscated goods, etc.). 
Today there are 43 County courts and 11 District courts and 2 stages of appeal, first to the High 
courts and the second one to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia. The Supreme Court is 
the highest appellate court in the state. It works primarily as a court of cassation15. There are also 
four specialized Labor Courts, a Social and Labor Court, and a Social and Labor Court of Appeal. 
In 1998, an Administrative Court was established as a specialised court with divisions in four cities. 
Organizational complexity is thus quite developed and in line with all other Western European 
countries. Formally, Judicial Council, the Ministry of Justice and the president of courts shared the 
main function of the judicial system governance. The courts presidents, assisted by the personnel 
councils, manage individual courts while the Judicial Council and the Minister of Justice share the 
administrative tasks at national level. This mixed system of judges administration between judicial 
and political bodies should distribute control and accountability across various branches and 
institutions. According to the EU reports, the system has proven to be quite functioning and 
effective, while other sources (see in particular EUMAP 2001) and the representative of the Judges 
Association claimed that courts depend on the executive for a variety of services (organization an 
                                                 
11 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia,2 April 1994. 
12 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia,13 April 1994. 
13 Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, 13 April 1994. 
14 Interview with the President of the Judges Association of Slovenia, 2007 April 13th Ljubljana 
15 The Supreme Court is the highest appellate court in the state. It works primarily as a court of cassation. It is a court of appellate 
jurisdiction in criminal and civil cases, in commercial lawsuits, in cases of administrative review and in labor and social security 
disputes. It is the court of third instance in almost all the cases within its jurisdiction. The grounds of appeal to the Supreme Court 
(defined as extraordinary legal remedies in Slovenian procedural laws) are therefore limited to issues of substantive law and to the 
most severe breaches of procedure (Čarni and Košak 2006). 
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operation of courts, personnel, material and infrastructure support, etc.) and that the Ministry retains 
a key role in appointing and removing the court presidents. 
 
SELF-GOVERNING BODY 
The 1991 Constitution established also the Judicial Council (Art. 130-131) as an 
autonomous state body. The Judicial Council is composed of eleven members elected for a non-
renewable five-year term; five of them elected by the National Assembly on the proposal of the 
President of the Republic from among university professors of law, attorneys and other lawyers16, 
and the other six members are elected by judges holding permanent judicial office from among their 
own number17. The Supreme Court elects one member among them. 
The position and the competence of the Judicial Council were defined only in 1994, when the 
Courts Act has been settled out. Article 28 established in fact that the Council shall propose 
candidates to the National Assembly to be elected to judicial office; to propose the dismissal of a 
judge; decide on the incompatibility, give an opinion on the status, rights and duties as well as 
judicial personnel; and exercise other administrative functions (Courts Act 1994). The Italian 
“Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura” inspired the Slovenian Council model.18 However, unlike 
the Italian one, more competences remain in the hands of the Ministry or of the National Assembly. 
From its first establishment, in 1994, the Council worked quite well, it acquired a good level of 
legitimacy in its relation with both with the National Assembly and the other political institutions, 
and with the judge’s representative. Only some cases of discordance between the Council and the 
National assembly on judge’s appointment have been reported by the international observer (EU 
Regular Reports, EUMAP 2001) and by the experts interviewed.  
 
SELECTION PROCESS 
The Judicial Council is entitled to propose the candidate for the first appointment to the 
National Assembly. Among other conditions (see Court Act) the candidates for judges have to be 
lawyers with the state’s law exam, with at least 3 years of work in law after the exam. 
The selection process for all levels involves judicial, executive and legislative input. The personnel 
councils within the courts formulates a reasoned opinion on the suitability of the candidate and 
sends it to the Judicial Council. In electing a candidate, the Judicial Council shall not be bound by 
the opinions of the personnel council or the Ministry. The National Assembly decides the 
appointment of a candidate to the position of Supreme Court Judges. The National Assembly has 
                                                 
16 Two professors, two advocates and one lawyer. 
17 One judges of the Supreme Court, two judges of the high courts and three judges of a first level courts. 
18 Interview with the Vice-President of the Judicial Council of Slovenia, 2007 April 12th, Ljubljana. 
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rarely rejected the candidatures proposed by the Judicial Council; this is an evidence of a certain 
balance between the Council and the Parliament that in other countries has not been yet achieved. 
Court Presidents are appointed by the Minister of justice from among the candidates proposed by 
the Judicial Council. If the candidate is rejected, he/she may request the Administrative Court or to 
the Constitutional Court to review the decision. 
 
JUDGES UNION 
 Slovenia is the only country belonging to the Former Yugoslavia in which a judges 
association was established already during the Socialist Republic. It was created in 1971 and before 
the independence it represented a place to discuss about salary, duties and judges problems. In this 
phase it was normal that all judges belonging to the association. In 1978 there was one of the first 
negotiation with the government about the judges salary and the association was treated as 
negotiating partner. This was a great success, but there were also important consultations in 
1983/1984 when some judicial reforms were settled out, as well as in 1979 and 198419. Today the 
Judges Association is fully recognized and legitimated but in the view of politicians and academics 
it is considered as a sort of “judges trade union”. In fact, the bulk of the Association activity is 
linked to salary bargaining.  
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Overall Slovenia acknowledged significant progress in the establishment of an independent 
judiciary, as the 1991 Constitution and the above-mentioned legislation incorporate the necessary 
formal elements to guarantee judicial independence. However, there are still area of concern, 
including the involvement of the executive in the judicial administration, the lack of public trust in 
the judiciary the absence of mechanisms ensuring intra-judicial integrity and external accountability 
(EUMAP 2001). From 2002 the Court Act was amended three times and according to the Judges 
Association20, all these amendments were directed to increase the power of the government in the 
appointment of court presidents and in the cases distribution. According to the international 
observers monitors (EUMAP, EU and Cepej), despite the progress made in the past decade, public 
trust in the judiciary remains low. Some parliamentarians have also called for abolition of judges’ 
life tenure. Some commentators argue that lack of political support could hamper the efficiency of 
the courts and undermines public support for the judiciary and its arguments. On the other side, the 
Judge Association admits that the inefficiency of the courts is a real problem and they are 
                                                 
19 Interview with the President of the Judges Association of Slovenia, 2007 April 13th Ljubljana. 
20 Interview with the President of the Judges Association of Slovenia, 2007 April 13th Ljubljana. 
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committed to find some solution for the organisational problem that hampered the functioning of 
the judiciary. 
The poor organisation of the judicial training represents another issue of concern related to the 
internal coherence of the judicial system. Slovenian judges admit that they have to insist on the 
socialisation in order to develop an adequate esprit de corps and to improve the professionalization 
of judges. Judges Association organizes each year a general conference with an high level of 
participation, in 2007 they focused all the program on “judicial training” trying to involve also the 
Ministerial representative. They are convinced that this type of events (common conferences, 
seminars and courses) could have a direct impact on the professionalization and consequently on the 
functioning of the judiciary as a whole. In the last year the number of Slovenian judges participating 
also in international conferences and networks is increased, although the members of the Judges 
Association admit that the language skill of the Slovenian judges is still really poor. 
 
5. Judicial reforms in Croatia21 
In Croatia, like in Serbia, the first post-Yugoslav elections opened the door to nationalistic 
forces led by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) under the leadership of former Partisan 
General and political dissident Franjo Tudjman. The HDZ won the 1990 election for its anti-
communist expression of Croatian identity. As long as Serbs occupied Croatian territory, Tudjman 
was able to monopolize power in Croatia. In December 1990 the new Constitution was passed 
which was a mixed presidential parliamentary system with strong presidential powers. He was able 
to tailor the new Constitution to his own ambitions in a perfect authoritarian style. For the whole 
decade of the 90s Croatian politics was in fact characterised by an authoritarian style of governance, 
accompanied by international isolationism and suspect towards any type of supranational 
organisation like the EU (Jović 2006). With Tudjman’s death in the run-up to elections in 2000, a 
moderate six-party opposition coalition headed by the Social Democratic Party led by Racan won 
control of the parliament on a campaign that included accession to the EU.  
Concerning the specific features of the judiciary, Uzelac (2000) describes as, from a formal legal 
standpoint, the 1990 Constitution provided a new regulation and status for judicial power. The 
changes were mainly reflected in the introduction of the division and separation of powers and in 
the warranties for the autonomy and independence of judicial power. The Constitution included also 
                                                 
21 A complete analysis of the judicial reform process in Croatia during the 1990-2000 can be found in various contributions by 
Professor Uzelac, Law School of Zagreb. See in particular Uzelac (2000, 2003, 2004) 
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some vague provisions about the status of judges; judicial office was defined as “permanent” but 
with some exceptions that made the interpretation of this provision difficult and opaque22. 
Coehn (1992) reminds as, in spite of this provisions, less than six months after taking power, 
Tudjman had already replaced 280 judicial official. The controversial laws adopted following the 
Constitutional provisions gave the Minister of Justice wide latitude over the appointment and 
especially over the removal of personnel. Top officials in the Ministry would be able to decide 
whether judges had the proper human and civil qualities to fulfil their responsibilities. Some 
members of the legal community objected that the vagueness of the new laws threatened the 
independence at the same degree as the Communists used ideological criteria. New provision 
appeared to have as its sole aim the purging of former communist judges and prosecutors, allowing 
their replacement by new judges supportive of the Tudjman government. This means again a further 
decreasing of the professional qualifications and skills of judges, undermining the level of 
autonomy and coherence. The state of emergency declared during the 1991 Balkan war, meant a 
further concentration of powers in the hands of executive. Uzelac (2000) highlights that judicial 
reforms during the 90s may be better qualified as the lack of reform, or as an anti-reform. The 
absence of a mid-long range strategy of development was a clear message to the judiciary. 
Therefore, until the end of the 90s, there was a strong outflow of judges to other legal professions. 
Most of the judges that left the judiciary were among the best qualified and experienced; this 
contributed to decrease again the Croatian judiciary profesionalization.  
  
 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION 
A hierarchy of legal system arranged in four levels characterizes the judiciary in Croatia. 
The Courts Act enacted in 1993 provides a basic legislative framework for the organization of the 
judiciary. Courts of General Jurisdiction are the first level. These courts adjudicate in all disputes 
except in those where law explicitly determines the jurisdiction of another court. These courts are 
organized in three instances and are divided into regions. Municipal Courts are courts with first 
instance jurisdiction in both civil and penal cases.  
The Supreme court is the highest court in Croatia and as the last instance it decides on extraordinary 
legal remedies against valid court decisions of the courts of general jurisdiction (dismissed appeal), 
and all other courts in Croatia. The Supreme Court is also an appellate court in all cases where 
municipal court was the first instance (Kuecking and Žugi 2005). Supreme Court has significant 
administrative tasks and functions concerning the judiciary as a whole. However, also the Ministry 
                                                 
22 Article 120: a judge may be relieved of his judicial office only 1. at his own request; 2. if he has become permanently incapacitated 
to perform his office; 3. if he has been sentenced for a criminal offence which makes him unworthy to hold judicial office; 4. if in 
conformity with law it is so decided by the High Judiciary Council of the Republic owing to the commission of an act of serious 
infringement of discipline (Uzelac 2000). 
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of Justice mantain a significant control over the court administration. Right to appeal is a 
constitutional right of every citizen and a right of every legal entity, according to the practice of the 
Constitutional Court. 
The most interesting data about judicial organization in Croatia concern the rationalization of the 
territorial organization that seems still to be a relevant problem. On this aspect one of the 
interviewed23 reminds as Croatia is the country with the higher number of judges pro-capita and 
also of courts24. What happened in the 90s was that Minister of Justice accused for the judiciary 
inefficiency, answered creating new courts, also where they were not needed. This over number of 
courts contributed to seriously undermine the functioning and the efficiency of the judiciary as a 
whole; this had also a negative impact over the public perception of the judiciary. This suggests that 
the simply hierarchical and horizontal development of the judiciary, considered as an indicator of 
organizational complexity, gives us only a partial explanation about the real level of 
institutionalization. Moreover, it seems that the only organizational complexity, without an adequate 
level of autonomy and coherence, does not have a decisive influence on the institutionalization of 
the judicial system. 
 
SELF-GOVERNING BODY AND SELECTION PROCESS  
The idea of a professional body responsible for conducting “internal affairs of the judiciary” 
and with relevant functions in the selection process was introduced in the Croatian Constitution in 
the period of the nation building and democracy optimism of 1990. The models were the French 
and the Italian Superior Councils of the Judiciary. But the idea of the self-government of the 
judiciary seemed to be too avant-garde for the period of transition as its implementation was 
delayed for many years. 
In the period from 1991 to 1994, judiciary was in an informal limbo: judges were constitutionally 
well protected but on the practice they were put into a position of permanent provisionally (Uzelac 
2000, 2003, 2004). The 1993 Court Act, according to the Constitution, provided that a body named 
“State Judicial Council” had to appoint, discipline and remove judges. However, until late 1994 
there was no such body and no rules on its composition. In such a vacuum, according to Uzelac 
(2000) practice responded in various ways. “Judges continued to be appointed and removed from 
office by Croatian Sabor (Parliament). In some five years, the mandate of a significant portion of 
judges expired; some of the judges simply continued to perform their functions (?!); some of them 
received formal decrees on the expiry of their mandate and consequent cessation of their office; and 
                                                 
23 Interview with a Professor of the Law Faculty- University of Zagreb, 2007 10th April, Zagreb. 
24 See CEPEJ (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice) – European Judicial Systems Edition 2006  
(http://www.coe.int/T/DG1/LegalCooperation/CEPEJ/evaluation/2006/CEPEJ_2006_eng.pdf)  
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some were simply notified that they have to empty the premises due to the “new situation” (Uzelac 
2000: 8). 
The Law on State Judicial Council (LSJC) passed in 1993. The LSJC foreseen that all members of 
the SJC have to be appointed with the 8 years mandate by the Parliament. The law provided also 
that in the process of selection of candidates for the president and the members of the SJC, Supreme 
Court of the RC, Minister of Justice, State Attorney, and the national Bar Association nominate 
persons considered to be suitable for the candidates. 
The manner in which the SJC became a “lever in the hands of the executive” power was simple 
(Uzelac 2003). The time of the appointment coincided with the period of intense parliamentary 
crisis, during which most of the oppositional parties instructed their deputies to leave the 
parliament, and for several months the parliament enacted laws without debate, only by votes of the 
HDZ. A first clash in the process of appointment of the SJC members happened in the Supreme 
Court that presented two very different lists of candidates. The other bodies empowered for 
nomination also submitted their candidates. In the meantime, the leadership of the HDZ and 
Tudjman himself decided to take things into their hands: an informal commission presided by 
Tudjman’s counsel for national affairs drafted its own list of candidates, vastly from people loyal to 
politics of the ruling party. Since such a body did not have official capacity to propose candidates, 
an innovative formula was found: the Attorney General presented such a list. All of the candidates 
from this list were accepted, and the candidates proposed by the legitimate professional bodies 
designated by law were rejected25. The Council began its activity during a period when 
authoritarian tendencies of the Tudjman regime were increasing. What the SJC did in this period 
was only controversial and reflected the political nature of its role. From 1995 to 2000 many of the 
provisions and the appointments made by the SJC were appealed toward the Constitutional Court, 
mainly by the Judges Association of Croatia and by groups of rejected candidates. The 
Constitutional Court accepted some of those appeals. In spite of this, prior of 2000, the 
Constitutional Court’s victory over the SJC were merely formal, without concrete abrogation of the 
above mentioned provisions. 
 
JUDGES UNION  
The Croatian Judges Association was founded in 1991. In the middle of the 90s the 
Association tried to oppose the arbitrariness of the SJC but with poor results. A leadership was 
elected in late 1997 and since then the Association has achieved more significant victories, 
                                                 
25In fact, the only candidates who were appointed as members of the SJC without express political influence were two 
law professors nominated jointly by four Croatian law schools. These two later turned to be the most vehement critics 
of the actions of the SJC. 
 16
especially regarding the judges salary. About 80% of Croatian judges are member of the 
Association. In the last ten years the Association publicly criticized the government for various 
actions, with a very aggressive approach. Some of the interviewed retained that, given this 
aggressive and corporative style, the Association was rather counterproductive in the project of 
judicial reform. Starting from 2000, the Association opposed also many of the government 
innovations directed to adjust the functioning of the SJC. According to the expert interviewed, this 
a priori opposition to all the changes and innovations in the name of the judicial independence, 
contributed to undermine the public perception of the Association. Some interviewed argued that it 
is not a real professional association but rather a trade union. Now the association seems to be more 
open also to the international collaboration but, according to the opinion of the interviewed, its aim 
is always the same: maintaining the judges corporativism. Looking at the institutionalization 
dimensions, this empowerment of the judge representative, a common trend of the Western 
judiciaries, is a rather positive indicator of institutionalization, although not always functional to the 
reform goals. Nevertheless, without adequate spaces and opportunities of socialization, the effect of 
a so strong association becomes visible only in relation to salary and pecuniary matters. 
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
The peak of the crisis between the judiciary and the government was reached in 1998-1999. 
After many cases of political appointment and removal in particular at the high level positions 
(famous is the case of the Supreme Court Presidents Vuković and Olujić) the public perception of 
an inefficient and politicized judiciary was widespread. In 1998 a new Minister of Justice was 
nominated (Milan Ramliak) a professor of the Zagreb law School; short after the Parliament asked 
him a task to prepare the basis for a comprehensive reform of the judiciary. With this aim, the 
Minister of Justice, for the first time in the Croatian history publicized various data from all the 
courts. It was the first public and informative survey on Croatian judiciary that evidenced the high 
length of proceedings and the backlog of old cases. The decisive strike came from the top of the 
state: in 1999, in Tudjman annual address to the nation, significant place was given to the problems 
of the judiciary. Only a few days after a tempest arose in the whole national judiciary, evidencing 
the absolute need of quick reforms.  
In 1999 the Parliament enacted the Law on Judicial Salaries, raising them of about 50% and short 
after the along waited amendments to the Law on State Judicial Council were enacted. Then the 
events came to favour the judicial reform developments: the illness and the death of Tudjman and 
the result of the 2000 parliamentary election in which the HDZ was defeated by the democratic 
opposition. During 2000 the Constitutional Court repealed as unconstitutional several provision of 
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the SJC; among them those concerning the appointment and dismissal of judges and court 
presidents. The Constitutional Court imposed some decisions to made also significant change in the 
Constitution. The most relevant innovations, aimed at reducing the core of political intervention, 
were the establishment of a separate body for the attorneys and the reduction of the SJC members 
from 15 to 11, with the incompatibility of membership in SJC with court presidencies. Other 
provisions gave broader power to the Constitutional Court in appealing against SJC decision. 
The appointment procedure was radically modified with the introduction of the judicial councils 
that, like in many other European countries, have duties regarding the court administration and the 
judge’s evaluation for the appointment. The changes introduced in 2000, and the subsequent 
amendments to the Courts Act, formally provided adequate limitations to the political appointment. 
The SJC should appoint the judges only on the basis of professional criteria provided by judicial 
councils of each court, but many concerns remain about the lack of clearly defined objective criteria 
that councils must use. According to the experts interviewed, the difficulty in providing transparent 
information about judges makes the SJC members preferences stills the most influential criteria. On 
the whole, nowadays the public perception of the SJC is a little bit different, it is not yet perceived 
as a “leaver in the hands of the executive” but only as a sort of “hot potato” for the government, 
meaning that it is becoming a body of judges’ lobby and influence.  
Given those developments, it could be argued that the degree of autonomy has recently improved, 
although the system will need some years to embed the changes introduced. In this way, the 
Croatian candidature to the EU membership represents a powerful lever to reach at least the 
adoption of important rules and norms concerning the judiciary.  
 
6. Judicial reforms in Serbia 
In Serbia the judicial system that emerged from post-FRY transition kept working along the same 
previous patterns. It was in fact subordinated to the dominant party that was no longer the 
Yugoslavian Communist Party, but Milošević’s socialist party (Miller 2000). As Cohen (1992) 
suggests, if Milošević in the first stage of his presidency declared his willingness to depoliticize legal 
matters with respect to the communist ideological criteria, he in truth operated a repoliticization of 
justice in terms of Serbia’s ethnic interests.  
Milošević’s purge of the entire judicial system started in 1997-1998 and ended in 2000, when the 
crisis was clearly approaching. During this period, about nine hundred out of 2000 active judges in 
the entire Serbian judiciary system were dismissed and substituted. The judicial system that 
emerged from the ten-year Milošević government was weak from a professional as well as from a 
material point of view. Many of the judges that had somehow opposed the requests coming from the 
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regime had been dismissed and some of them still lived semi clandestinely. Those who were not 
removed only acted according to the regime’s will. After 1996, no judicial decision was made that 
could somehow oppose Milošević’s party. 
During the Milošević decade the level of judicial institutionalization further decreased. If during the 
federal republic the “double system of conflict resolution” leaved some space for the judges 
independence, with Milošević in office every type of judicial cases had to be solved with the regime 
agreement. Thus, the level of adaptability, the differentiation and the autonomy of the judicial 
system were weakened in respect to the FRY period. Immediately after Milošević’s discharge, the 
first step made by the ad interim Koštunica26 government was to re-establish the old judicial system 
legislation and to cancel all those decisions, made by Milošević, that had caused dismissal of those 
judges that had opposed election fraud and manipulation promoted by the regime (especially the 
1996 election). What needs to be underlined here is that a potential purge of the judiciary became an 
urgent issue after the 2000 October Revolution. However, the transition leaders decided to reform 
the system without deeply invading the judicial body27. One of the experts interviewed28 underlines 
that, if a drastic lustratia had been performed, the Serbian judiciary would had been halved. The 
lack of an adequate number of candidates potentially suitable for taking the role of magistrate was 
one of the reasons for undertaking the organisational reform path without a lustratia. 
 
JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
The first significant stage of the judicial system reform seemed to have been reached in 
November 2001 with the launch of an important set of judicial system-related laws. The set was 
made of five laws: 1) Law on Judges; 2) Law on Public Prosecution; 3) Law on High Judicial 
Council; 4) Law on courts organization; 5) Law on Seats and Districts of Courts and Public 
Prosecutor’s Offices (all published in the Official Gazette of Serbia, n° 63/2001). Overall, the five 
laws in their original drafting should have introduced some fairly relevant changes.  
According to the Law on the Organization of Courts, the court system of Serbia is divided into 
courts of general jurisdiction and specialized courts. Courts of general jurisdiction include the 
Supreme Court, courts of appeal (which still have not been constituted), and municipal and district 
courts. Specialized courts include the commercial courts and the yet to be constituted 
Administrative Court. Special panels for prosecuting war crimes and organized crime have been 
established within the Belgrade District Court. In addition, a Constitutional Court hears and decides 
                                                 
26 On 6 October 2000 Koštunica, during his first official speech, affirmed to be willing to create an ad interim government. This 
lasted until December, when official elections took place and Djindjić was nominated Prime Minister of a majority government in 
which all the parties of the DOS coalition participated. 
27 The ad interim government actually adopted a ‘forced dismissal’ policy by inviting judges in relevant positions to leave their 
office. However, the entity and concreteness of these measures was never such as to be described as a real purge. 
28 Interview with a Serbian jurist, Political Advisor at the Stability Pact for Southern Europe, June 2006, Brussels. 
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matters that involve the constitutionality of laws, regulations, and official acts. The Supreme Court 
is the highest court of general jurisdiction in Serbia. There are 138 municipal courts and 30 district 
courts located throughout Serbia. The municipal and district courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction. District courts also exercise first instance jurisdiction but in matters of a more serious 
nature. Until the new courts of appeal are constituted, district courts will continue to serve as courts 
of second instance and hear appeals from municipal court decisions. Decisions of municipal and 
district courts may be appealed to the appellate courts once these courts are constituted (ABA-Ceeli 
2005). Judicial administration function is mainly in the hands of the Ministry of Justice. 
Looking at the organizational complexity of the Serbian judiciary it could be noticed as the 
organizational structure, especially considering the hierarchical level, is still uncompleted and 
frequently subjected to changes. Special courts and panels have been established but persistently 
threatened by political control and influence. 
 
SELF-GOVERNING BODY AND SELECTION 
The introduction of a new self-governed body, which was meant to play an important role in 
the recruitment process, represented, however, the most relevant change introduced by the above 
mentioned laws. The Law on Judges established that magistrates would be elected by the National 
Assembly according to the suggestions of the High Council of the Judiciary (HJC). Such law 
established that the HCJ should be composed of six permanent and two ‘invited’ members (a judge 
and a Public Prosecutor). The President of the Superior Court, the District Attorney, the Minister for 
Justice, a member elected by the Lawyers Association and two members elected by the National 
Assembly were part of the six members (Art. 3). According to the Law, National Assembly should 
elect only the candidates proposed by the HCJ. In light of the above-mentioned changes this body 
should have taken on a relevant role in recruiting and selecting magistrates. In the meantime, the 
Law on Judges provided for creation of another body, the Grand Personnel Council (GPC). This 
differed from the HCJ because the latter was in charge of all decisions concerning the dismissal or 
the termination of the judge’s function. This body was made of nine judges of the Superior Court 
nominated by the president of the court itself.  
These data already explains that the only function attributed to the HCJ regarded candidature 
proposals with the presence of another institution, strictly related to the Ministry, which decided on 
dismissal/termination issues. The Law on Judges foresaw that the National Assembly was obliged 
to nominate magistrates only via candidatures proposed by the HCJ. In the case the candidatures 
proposed by the HCJ were rejected, it had to reconsider them and propose some new ones. Already 
in July 2002, the Serbian Democratic Party (DSS, Koštunica Party) proposed a set of amendments 
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to the five laws on the judicial system. The National Assembly adopted such amendments at once. 
They aimed at changing exactly the Law on Judges, establishing that the National Assembly could 
reject candidatures proposed by the HCJ and nominate some other candidates appointed by a special 
commission within the National Assembly. There was therefore an attempt to create another body, 
directly connected to the National Assembly, which would allow the parties to control the 
appointments more directly. At the beginning of 2003 the HCJ had not yet been established because 
of delays and general problems in achieving an agreement on the choice of the members29. At the 
beginning of 2003 the DSS proposed new amendments aiming at reaffirming the role of the 
National Assembly in recruitment of magistrates. The attempt to reaffirm the power of the National 
Assembly over the nomination of judges for the disadvantage of the self-government body 
represented the thread running through the different amendments.  
The assassination of Djindjić in 2003 worsened the situation. This year represented another 
stalemate30 for judicial reform, since the debate on the 2001 set of laws, which yet had not been 
applied, was suspended. The first months of 2004, after the new Koštunica government came into 
office, seemed to give new impetus overcoming the stalling created during the state of emergency. 
In April 2004, the government proposed some new amendments updating the Law on Judges on the 
basis of the different sentences delivered by the Constitutional Court during the previous years. 
These new amendments gave back to the HCJ the power to propose candidates for the nomination 
as magistrates and court presidents. However, in truth, the governments continued to reject several 
nominations coming from the HCJ until December 2004.  
 
JUDGES UNION 
This Association, which was initially formed by magistrates who had opposed the 
manipulation of the outcome of the 1996 election, was not legalised for a few years. In 1999, 13 
judges were dismissed because of their active involvement in the Serbian Judges Association 
Following the dismissal of these judges it suspended its activity. It reopened only in 2000, when it 
finally was registered as one of the legally recognised associations. This association is today the 
only collective actor that expresses a precise point of view on judicial reform and tries to be a 
interlocutor of the government. The Serbian Judges Association was never involved in judicial 
                                                 
29 As Hiber (2005) and the OSCE report (2003) describe, at the end of the several disputes regarding the institution of the HCJ the 
Superior Serbian Court maintained the main power of the choice of the members that would have to compose the HCJ. The judges of 
the Superior Court are nominated directly by the National Assembly.  
30 Several articles on daily newspapers and basically all the humanitarian agencies' reports highlighted that during the state of 
emergency, the Serbian government explicitly violated its citizens' human rights. In the days following the murder of Djindjić a 
particularly serious case was registered: the Parliament dismissed 35 judges without receiving permission from the Superior Court, 
which was formally necessary. As a consequence of this, the President of the Superior Court resigned (ABA Ceeli 2005; Osce 2003; 
EU SAP Report 2004). 
 21
policies, not even concerning salary. Despite considerable challenges, the Association has tried to 
organize many activities to professionalize judges and to diffuse international practice and standards 
in Serbia. International donors as USAID and ABA-Ceeli particularly supported them. The only 
project in which the Association was involved together with a governmental representative is the 
Judicial Training Centre, fully established throughout international donors funds, especially UNDP, 
USAID and OSCE. The training program that were activated seemed to be useful and quite 
effective. According to the interviewed, today there are a part of Serbian judges that, thanks to the 
various experience of international socialization, acquired new competences and qualifications. 
Although only a small part of judges have beneficed of those occasions.  
The level of institutionalization of this Association is very low. The government does absolutely not 
considered them. If this organization would be able to work in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Justice, they would be able to increase significantly the level of coherence within the judiciary. 
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
During the 2005, no substantial reforms have been approved and the influence of the political 
parties over the judiciary continued to be high and visible. A definitive text for the judicial reform 
strategy was then presented by the government in April 2006. The government stressed the adoption 
of this strategy and affirmed that this represented a relevant step in the judicial reformation 
process31. However, once again the recruitment rules and the self-government functions represented 
the crucial knots. (Mitev-Shantek 2006). The Judges Association was not involved in the drafting of 
the strategy, although they prepared documents and papers in order to integrate it. In spite of the 
approval of the Strategy (May 2006), few of the provisions it contains have been implemented32. 
The new Constitution, approved by a national referendum at the end of October 2006, will bring 
substantial changes also in relation to the judiciary. The Constitution mentions, for the first time in 
the Serbian history, the existence of a self-governing body for the judiciary that will be in charge of 
appointment and promotion procedures. Many of the innovations contained in the Strategy and in 
the new Constitution need, in fact, additional legislation to allow their implementation.  
The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in its 2006 report33 evidenced as the judiciary is most 
stagnant sector of reform in Serbia. In the course of the 2006 the government considered as their 
biggest success the number of law passed by the parliament. The enforcement of that laws remained 
                                                 
31 The government approved the strategy to comply with the requests of the EU that was asking for it since 2004 in the 
context of the Stabilization and Association Process; the drafting of the strategy is the direct result of the work done by 
international donors, some of them working with EU funds. On this aspect see Dallara 2007. 
32 Interview with the former President of the Judges Association of Serbia, 2006 October 26th, Belgrade. 
33 Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. Annual Report: Serbia 2006. Human rights: hostage to the state regression. 
Belgrade 2007. 
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totally silent. Political parties (both majority and opposition ones) acted as a sort of cohesive block, 
aiming at inhibiting the reform process, being afraid of the possible consequences of the reform. In 
early 2007 some ministers proposed to reelect all the judges by a government’s initiative. This 
caused sharp reaction of public and legal experts. Corruption and clientelism, widespread within 
Serbian parties and political institutions, make virtually impossible the establishment of an 
independent judiciary. According to the interviewed, within the judicial system, there is an 
imaginary thin line between two states of minds: that of judges that are afraid for the political 
pressure over the judiciary and the other of judges that are not afraid and that see their career linked 
to the political will. Thus, they accept passively the political will. For sure this is one of the most 
evident legacies of the past that Serbia is not yet able to overcome. The level of autonomy is thus 
extremely low.  
 
7. Conclusions:  
 
According to Bumin, Randazzo and Walker (2005), courts are enabled to undergo the process of 
institutionalization only if political and legal stability allows the court to develop properly, 
contributing to judicial effectiveness. This implies that the stability of the domestic political 
environment, that is the absence of high political fragmentation, the absence of ethnic cleavages and 
a finished state-building, became necessary conditions for the institutionalization of the judiciary. 
These conditions were virtually absent in the historical and political events of the Yugoslavian 
countries. In fact, the analysis of the main steps of the judicial reform in each country shows that, 
starting from the Yugoslav federation desegregation (1990), the process of judicial 
institutionalization was continually undermined by the political instability that characterized all the 
area, impeding the courts to reach an adequate level of complexity, autonomy and coherence. The 
main reason seems to be that in these countries, especially in Serbia and Croatia, the 1990s decade 
represent a sort of step back for what concerns the judicial institutionalization as these countries 
experienced ethno-authoritarian hybrid regimes in which a sort of ethno-political justice replaced 
socialist legality (Cohen 1992). This happened also in Slovenia although to a limited extent and 
only at the beginning of the 90s. This stalling situation, in term of institutionalization, implied that 
when the ethno-authoritarian regimes fallen down in Serbia and Croatia (2000), any of the above 
mentioned dimensions for the judicial institutionalization were not fully reached. Although some 
progresses were undoubtedly accomplished in the last fifteen years, it is necessary to make a clear 
distinction between the formal adoption and the implementation of judicial institutions and reforms. 
A common feature of the countries is in fact the adoption of rules, norms and institutions that seem 
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to empower the judicial system vis-à-vis the other political institutions, but that remain mainly only 
on the paper. Thus, the only formal establishment of judicial institutions and norms cannot be 
considered as a valid indicator of judicial institutionalisation. 
Even in the last decade, the process of judicial institutionalisation continued to be threatened by 
domestic political instability and fragmentation. In this context political actors rather than 
empowering courts in strategic way, as the comparative judicial studies literature suggest, continued 
to maintain the judiciary as a sort of “inferior power”, claiming for the lack of profesionalization 
and efficiency. Under this attacks, the magistracy seems to be still unable to fill the gap in the 
socialization and professionalization of the corps, missing a fully institutionalisation.  
Looking at the legacy of the past framework, former Yugoslavian countries are a very interesting 
case for three main reasons: first of all, although for many features the Yugoslav socialism matches 
the definition of authoritarian regime (Linz 1975), even with some traits of a democratizing and 
pluralistic authoritarianism, for what concerns the organization and the functioning of the judicial 
system seems to belong to the totalitarian type. Although the “double-system of justice” was in 
place also in Yugoslavia, what distinguishes it from the Southern European authoritarian regimes 
was the high degree of party control over the appointment and dismissal of judges. If in the 
experience of the Southern European countries during the non-democratic regime the professional 
recruitment and socialisation criteria of magistrates coexisted with the political ones, it was not the 
same in Yugoslavia. The totalitarian traits of the organization of the judiciary in Yugoslavia 
impeded the judicial institutions to reach the qualities of viable and stable institutions.  
Finally, if we aim to explain the low judicial institutionalization looking at the legacies of the past, 
it seems important to take into account also the legacies of the period that precedes the non-
democratic regimes, that is the period form the end of 1800 until the Second World War. A 
substantial difference between the countries of the Balkan region and the Southern European ones 
concerns the fact that in the former ones, as mentioned above, the Romanist civil law tradition was 
introduced later. Moreover, during the nineteenth century, the unstable socio-political system 
reigning in the countries belonging to that area delayed the development and modernisation of the 
political and administrative institutions in different national contexts (Hosch 2006). When Western 
Balkan countries entered the Soviet sphere of influence, an institutionalised judiciary system did not 
yet exist. We have already mentioned that the majority of the judicial institutions were created 
during the soviet experience. While in the Southern European countries, the institutional framework 
at the basis of the judicial systems had fully developed and had incorporated all the fundamental 
elements for the civil law before the authoritarian regimes phase. This allowed some norms and 
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habits to survive even during the non-democratic regime phases, preserving a minimum level of 
professionalism in the magistracy.  
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